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
CRISIS RESPONSE POLICY: SHOULD IT BE CHANGED?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Protecting the United States national security (people, homeland, and way of life) is the number one priority of senior U.S. civilian and military leaders. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement policy, which is supported by the National Military Strategy (NMS) policy, was developed to provide this protection. Crisis response is one aspect of U.S. policy stipulated in the NSS and NMS. As a crucial part of U.S. policy, it supports all elements of power to deter threats, and when necessary, to fight and win wars. The U.S. military force structure, however, must be sufficiently sized to counter threats and respond to crises around the world. There is a growing concern within the Department of Defense (DOD) that current U.S. crisis response policy set forth in the NSS and NMS is not sufficient and needs to be changed. Some critics believe it does not clarify how U.S. military forces can and will respond to two almost simultaneous wars given the lift capability shortfall. U.S. senior leadership are thus challenged to develop a more viable crisis response policy that will support two almost simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) with a smaller but balanced military force structure.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACTiii
TABLE OF CONTENTSv
Introduction1
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW (BUR)2
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)
CRISIS RESPONSE POLICY/SYSTEM COMPONENT
CRISIS RESPONSE AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
FOCUS OF PLANNING FOR GLOBAL CONFLICTS
MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
IDENTIFICATION OF A THREAT/CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OBJECTIVES17
CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE COMPOSITION
CRISIS RESPONSE COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
Conclusions21
RECOMMENDATIONS23
Endnotes
Bibliography27

vi

INTRODUCTION

In a world where challenges and threats to our nation's security from beyond and within our borders are no longer readily defined, the U.S. needs a clear and concise crisis response policy that will support its national security interests. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement emphasizes the integration and application of all elements of national power, to include the diplomatic, economic, political and military elements, in support of U.S. policy to defend or advance U.S. interests abroad. The following analysis focuses on the military role in support of our National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). Some critics of the current NSS and NMS believe that the existing U.S. crisis response policy is not clear and concise; they further contend that our current military force structure is not sufficient to support our NSS and NMS. This strategic research paper seeks to determine whether the policy should be changed, and, if so, how.

Our current NSS states when our national security interests are threatened, we will, as America always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must. We will act with others when we can, but alone when we must. We therefore will send American troops abroad only when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake. When we do so, they will pursue clear objectives to which we are firmly committed. But no deployment of American service members is risk-free, and we must remain clear in our purpose and resolute in deploying and committing them to missions abroad. As a nation with global interests, it is important that the United States maintain forces with aggregate capabilities on a global scale. Obviously we seek to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily

committed elsewhere. More basically, maintaining a "two war" force helps ensure the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by a coalition of hostile powers or by a larger, more capable adversary than we foresee today.²

The key element of a viable U.S. crisis response policy in support of the NSS and NMS is a ready force -- a force that can respond quickly to U.S. interests abroad, a force that is well-trained and well-equipped, a force that can be sustained, and a force that is properly sized to respond to multiple crises abroad. The President's defense budget for Fiscal Years 1996-2001 fully funds the force structure recommended by the Bottom-Up Review to support our NSS for two almost simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs).³

BOTTOM-UP REVIEW (BUR)

The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), prepared by the Secretary of Defense (Les Aspin) in October 1993, was to devise the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities to counter worldwide threats against U.S. interests.

The threat that drove the U.S. defense decisionmaking for four and a half decades, that determined U.S. strategy and tactics, doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the design of U.S. weapons, and the size of the U.S. budget is gone--the Soviet threat.⁴

However, future threats are emerging. We must address some fundamental questions as we prepare to meet these emerging threats. "How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for future threats?" And, "how much defense is enough in the post-Cold

War era?"⁵ These questions must be examined very closely when assessing policy and strategy for national security. Certainly we must not forget relevant past events. Several important events over the past four years highlight the revolutionary nature of recent changes in the international security world. The events also shed light on where the U.S. may be going with its future defense, security requirements, and crisis response preparedness.

In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe precipitated a strategic shift away from containment of the Soviet empire.
In 1990, Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait signaled a new class of regional dangers facing America -- dangers spurred not by a global, empire-building ideological power, but by rogue leaders bent on regional domination through military aggression while simultaneously pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities. The world's response to Saddam's invasion also demonstrated the potential in this new era for broad-based, collective military action to thwart such tyrants. Meanwhile, in 1991, the failed Soviet coup demonstrated the Russian people's desire for democratic change and hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union as a national entity and military foe. These situations make it necessary to plan, program, and budget for a force structure that can respond to at least two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

Despite the revolutionary changes that we have encountered over the past four years in our volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) security environment, the most basic goals of the U.S. have not changed. Our basic goals still are to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; to maintain the political

freedom and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of our nation and its people. We also have core values that we should promote at home and abroad to further our interests. These include democracy and human rights, peaceful resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of open markets in the international economic system. The BUR took all of these matters into consideration.

The BUR methodology called for: Assessing the Cold War Era; Devising U.S.

Defense Strategy; Constructing Force Building Blocks; Combining Force Building Blocks;

Decisions Regarding Force Structure, Modernization, Defense Foundations, and Policy

Initiative; and Building a Multi-Year Defense Plan. The BUR was drawn up through

collaboration between civilian and military representatives of the Department of Defense

(DOD). These representatives anticipated the size of forces potential regional aggressors

will be capable of fielding in the future.

Potential regional aggressors are expected to be capable of fielding military forces in the following ranges: 400,000 - 750,000 total personnel under arms; 2,000 - 4,000 tanks; 3,000 - 5,000 armored fighting vehicles; 2,000 - 3,000 artillery pieces; 500 - 1,000 combat aircraft; 100 - 200 naval vessels, primary patrol craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles, and up to 50 submarines; and 100 - 1,000 Scud-class ballistic missiles, some possibly with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Military forces of this size could threaten regions important to the United States if allied and friendly states are unable to match their power. Therefore, the U.S. must have a credible and powerful force that it can project anywhere from the Continental United States (CONUS) or

Overseas-Continental United States (OCONUS) to any region of the world in a timely and most efficient manner -- power projection.

U.S. forces today are credible, powerful, and efficient. They are currently equipped, manned, and funded to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs. However, some U.S. senior officials believe that the U.S. does not have a sufficient force structure to adequately respond to two or more nearly simultaneous MRCs. They believe that the only way the U.S. can respond to two almost near simultaneous MRCs is with the help of its allied forces. The people responsible for moving forces to a theater and allocating assets between theaters have stated that there is insufficient lift to support two nearly simultaneous MRCs, for strategic and tactical operations.

The U.S. Force Structure up to 1999 projects approximately 10 Army Divisions (Active) and 5+ Divisions (Reserve); 11 Navy Aircraft Carriers (Active) and 1 Aircraft Carrier (Reserve/Training); 13 Air Force Fighter Wings (Active), 7 Fighter Wings (Reserve), and up to 184 Bombers (B-52H, B1, B2); 3 Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Forces: 174,000 Personnel (Active End-Strength), and 42,000 Personnel (Reserve End-Strength); 18 Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Forces (By 2003); up to 94 B-52H Bombers; 21 B-2 Bombers, and 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (Single Warhead). This projection substantiates that the U.S. has and will have up to 1999 a credible and powerful force structure, capable of effectively conducting at least two MRCs. However, as stated previously, the force structure is not the problem.

The existing U.S. NSS crisis response policy calls for the preparation of American Military Forces in the United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy in responding

to key dangers--those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats to the stability of friendly states worldwide. U.S. policy also advocates providing forces, when necessary, to prevent destructive forces such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats to U.S. information systems, and catastrophes from within, such as natural disasters, from endangering and threatening U.S. citizens. Active and/or reserve forces may be called upon for crisis response to support the NSS and NMS.

The current crisis response U.S. NMS that supports the NSS states that should our resolve to protect vital national interests be challenged, we must be able to respond rapidly through a wide spectrum of deterrent options and preventive measures. We intend to respond initially to crises using our forces stationed and deployed overseas, but we will be prepared to deploy all necessary forces to threatened areas as we demonstrated in October 1994 when Saddam Hussein once again moved forces south and threatened Kuwait. Critical to such reinforcements are sea- and land-based pre-positioned equipment sets, enhanced airlift and sealift capabilities, and air refueling forces. Rapid response power projection from the United States to overseas areas and between regions remains the key to crisis response.¹⁴

With potential fewer U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas, we must proportionately increase our capability to project forces abroad. While projecting forces to one contingency, we will be enhancing the readiness of other assets to handle a challenge elsewhere. Some high-leverage capabilities could be used in one major regional contingency and then reallocated and redeployed to another as conditions permit. Other

capabilities essential to fighting and winning the first conflict will remain in the theater where they are committed. 16

Although the BUR was developed to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new threats against the U.S. and its allies, it may not have answered all the questions about the best design for our forces to respond to future crises. Current defense strategy, outlined in the 1993 BUR, calls for a force able to win wars in the Middle East and Korea -- two MRCs. We have designed an instrument to frame the new responsibilities and threats facing the U.S. military and to design a force structure to handle these threats, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 17

One of the criticisms of the BUR was that it placed too much emphasis on maintaining the forces necessary to fight two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously and too little emphasis on day-to-day demands of military overseas presence and smaller scale contingencies. The QDR will supposedly steer DOD away from the idea of maintaining a force to deal specifically with two MRCs. Most defense officials and private sector observers believe the QDR will lead to a smaller and better-equipped military that won't be hollowed out by a decreasing budget. 18

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR)

The QDR was designed to reassess U.S. defense strategy, force structure, and military modernization programs. It will examine all aspects of what DOD does, why DOD does it, and how DOD does it and pays for it. The FY 97 National Defense

Authorization Act mandated the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996, which calls for: the conduct of a QDR and for the selection and operation of a related National Defense Panel (NDP). The NDP will consist of private sector non-partisan businessmen. They will review U.S. defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies. Some DOD officials believe that the NDP will have more influence on the future U.S. military force structure than the QDR. ¹⁹

The QDR will unquestionably be a collaborative effort. It will involve all key DOD officials, military and civilians. The offices of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs), and military services will participate in the QDR. The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) has the lead for the QDR in the Office of Secretary Defense (OSD). According to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act, the QDR will include the results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy; the threats examined for purpose of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of such threats; the assumptions used in the review, including those relating to the cooperation of allies and mission-sharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and estimated intensity and duration of conflict.

In addition, the QDR will address the effect on the force structure of preparations for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war; the effect on the force structure of our armed forces; use of technologies anticipated to be available

by 2005, including precision-guided munitions, stealth, night vision, digitization, and communications; and the changes in doctrine and operational concepts that would result from the use of such technologies.²⁰

The QDR will primarily focus on the manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days; the anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment needed to ensure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions; the appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces under the defense strategy, including in particular the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and defense agencies for that purpose.

The QDR will assess the airlift and sealift capabilities required to support the defense strategy; the forward presence, prepositioning, and other anticipatory deployments needed under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts; the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters; the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the defense strategy; and any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.²¹

The Army released "Army Vision 2010" on 13 November 1996. The Air Force released its vision for the 21st century shortly thereafter. The Navy considers its policy evolution from "Maritime Strategy" to "...From the Sea" to "Forward ... From the Sea" to set forth the evolution of the role of naval forces for the 21st century. There is no requirement for the services to develop other strategies for the QDR. Some senior civilian

officials believe the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force leaders are already lobbying to protect major service programs as the QDR progresses, leading to some skepticism concerning the outcome of the QDR.²² There is no evidence available to backup this belief.

The QDR will also focus on newer scenarios, such as peacekeeping and other immediate crises. It will base its recommended strategy on available future-year funding, projected to be about \$245 billion dollars annually. Budgetary experts inside and outside the U.S. government agree that current U.S. defense budgets beyond 2006 cannot and will not accommodate today's force structure, the projected future operational pace, and current service spending plans, expected to cost \$15 billion to \$20 billion annually. The budget will obviously drive the crisis response system and policy.²³

CRISIS RESPONSE POLICY/SYSTEM COMPONENT

The U.S. crisis response policy/system is a component of the U.S. Military

Strategy, which provides specific guidance for employing our Armed Forces around the

world to secure objectives that are within our national interest. Military strategy is a vital

link between national security and military planning operations. The U.S. crisis response

policy/system consists of crisis planning procedures, rapid response forces, and deterrent

options/preventive measures. Crisis action planning is one of the most important aspects

of the crisis response policy and system. Like deliberate planning, it involves a structured

process under the policies and guidance established in Joint Operations Planning and

Execution System (JOPES). It is carried out through a very comprehensive six-phased process.²⁴

Phase I (Situation Development) is initiated when a crisis is recognized and triggers the development of the CINC's assessment of the situation. Phase II (Crisis Assessment) is the evaluation of the CINC's assessment by the Chairman, JCS, and the National Command Authority (NCA) to determine whether a crisis is imminent. During Phase III (Course of Action Development), deliberate plans are reviewed, courses of actions are developed for the CINC, and estimates of supportability are provided by the component and supporting commanders. The CINC prepares and submits his commander's estimate and recommendation to the Chairman, JCS. During Phase IV (Course of Action Selection), a course of action is decided upon by the NCA. During Phase V (Execution Planning), a campaign plan and operations order (OPORD) is developed and deployment data bases are completed. The final phase, Phase VI, (Execution), involves the NCA's decision to execute the campaign plan or OPORD. This process is very crucial for planning for the actual commitment of allocated forces, based on the current situation, when a contingency response is imminent to support U.S. NSS and NMS.25

How does the existing NMS supports the current NSS? The NMS addresses the ends, ways and means of supporting the NSS. In short, the NMS covers what we should do; how we should do it; and what we should do it with to secure our response objectives. The current U.S. crisis response policy/system can likewise be expressed as ends, ways and means to achieve objectives. There are seldom purely military or purely

political objectives; they usually overlap. Therefore, the U.S. crisis response policy/system over the past three decades has been designed to respond to a variety of objectives.

Over the past 30 years, more than 2000 world situations have met the definition of crisis. Many of them have required some sort of crisis response. After a series of crises in the early 1970s, the National Command Authority (NCA) became concerned that the military organization for responding to crises was ineffective. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a system for time-sensitive military planning and implemented it in 1976.²⁷

One of the key elements of the U.S. crisis response policy/system components is "crisis planning." While deliberate planning is a good tool for anticipating future events, it is not a good tool for responding to real-time, unexpected situations that might require immediate U.S. military response. JCS thus developed flexible and diverse crisis planning procedures to satisfy emerging crisis situations. These procedures, however, are not shared among all agencies that may be involved in a crisis response, particularly between military and civilian officials. Planning procedures between interagencies must be shared if the U.S. is to be successful with crisis operations. Every crisis response operation that the U.S. has participated in recently reflects a need for improved interagency coordination.

CRISIS RESPONSE AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

The success of any crisis response policy depends in large part on interagency coordination, integration, and synchronization of all elements of a crisis, to include a response. Lessons learned from "Operation Restore Democracy," the UN-sanctioned,

U.S. led Haitian intervention, demonstrated a need for improvement in interagency planning and executing for future crisis responses -- humanitarian, disaster relief, peace-keeping and military force operations. For example, some of the specific interagency political-military lessons that were learned included: interagency planning doctrine for complex emergencies is needed; planning must compensate for organizational and operational differences between civilian and military organizations; agreement on interagency command and control arrangements are needed; agreements are needed on operational concepts for operations other than war (OOTW); and interagency command and control (C2) war games can help to work out interagency differences and expose agencies to each other.²⁹

Senior civilian participants in Operation Restore Democracy recommended that the U.S. government develop both doctrine and procedures for civil-military planning for emergencies like disaster assistance, humanitarian assistance, and peace-keeping operations in which civilians and military would be co-equal participants during the planning and executing process. Civilian and military organizations use different approaches to planning crisis response, which begins and ends with planning. Planning is an integral part of military procedure, and officers at all levels are exposed to mission planning and complex mobilization exercises throughout their careers. The military plan in detail and expect to meet planning targets. Civilian agencies do not have a similar cadre of experienced crisis-response mission planners. Indeed, they often rely on military officers to accomplish this task. Further, they do not plan at the level of detail that the military plans.

While the military, especially Special Operations personnel, are aware of the need for interface with their civilian counterparts, civilian agencies may not be aware of the capabilities of their military counterparts.³⁰ Without question, the military is able to effectively plan for and execute crisis operations. Regular exercises hone these skills. But U.S. military and civilian personnel can compensate somewhat for the interagency weakness if they focus their planning for global conflicts.

FOCUS OF PLANNING FOR GLOBAL CONFLICTS

The focus of U.S. planning for global theater conflicts is to deter, and if necessary, fight and defeat aggression (end) by potentially hostile powers abroad, such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others. To do this, we must have credible conventional or nuclear responses (ways) to any hostile aggression against the U.S. and its interests, in the form of a powerful and diverse military force and /or economic sanctions (means).³¹

Military strategy for the crisis response system provides OSD, CJCS, and the CINCs with procedures for getting vital decisionmaking information up the chain of command to the NCA in an effective and timely manner. The procedures allow the NCA to communicate its decisions accurately through the CJCS down the chain of command to the CINCs and Subordinates and Supporting Commanders, the Services, and Supporting Defense Agencies. They also permit key players in the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to exchange essential deployment data accurately and rapidly. These procedures, however, are not implemented until the NCA makes a decision to deploy military forces.³²

MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Prior to deploying military forces, the NCA invariably considers using other elements of power. NCA likewise considers the competing needs throughout the world for crisis response forces that exceed the total resources and forces available. Therefore, it is necessary for the NCA to establish national priorities and objectives and thus to use military force only where there is no other viable alternative.³³

U.S. military forces are key components in the formulation of our NMS in support of the NSS. To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and threats around the world, the current policy states that "the U.S. must be able to deploy robust and flexible military forces that can support at least two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs) -- (i.e., Korea and Middle East). These forces must be able to offset the military power of regional states that have threatening interests opposite those of the U.S. and its allies." However, the competing global needs for U.S. crisis response forces make it currently impossible to meet a demand greater than one MRC.³⁴

A very reliable senior DOD official who wishes to remain anonymous stated that "there are not enough U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) airlift and sealift assets available today to support a two nearly simultaneous MRC scenario." The DOD official went on to suggest that the U.S. Logistics Support System is not robust enough today to support two nearly simultaneous MRCs. These informed comments and observations suggest that the NCA must establish national priorities and objectives that are realistic, that can be supported by a reasonably sized U.S. crisis response force. The U.S. will also have to rely more on its allies to assist with crisis response efforts around

the world. The U.S., however, will continue to take the lead as a "super power." We will nonetheless have to withstand security risks.

The U.S. National Security Strategy calls for the preparation and deployment of American Military Forces to support U.S. diplomacy in response to key dangers, nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats to the stability of states. Although there may be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband limited resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations. And while it is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force, we must be as clear as possible about when and how we will use it. The decision on whether and when to use force is therefore dictated first and foremost by our national interests.³⁵

U.S. national leaders must determine the basic categories of our national interest before they use armed forces to counter threats. The first consideration involves

America's vital interests—interests of broad, overriding importance to our survival, security, and national vitality (i.e., defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being). The U.S. will do whatever it takes to defend these interests. The second consideration includes situations that are important but not vital—interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but that do affect our national well-being. We should be very scrupulous in using force in support of important interests, and such use of force should be strictly limited. The third and final consideration involves primarily humanitarian interests. The military is not the best means for addressing humanitarian concerns; it can, however, be used in a supportive role. So when is it proper to use

military force in pursuit of national interest? The answer to this question is largely dependent upon the nature and importance of the national interest in any given scenario (i.e., noncombatant operations).

Nonetheless, certain conditions and situations will develop when U.S. forces will be called upon to relocate threatened noncombatants from foreign countries abroad -- noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Although such operations are principally designed to evacuate U.S. citizens from a hostile environment, they may also include selective evacuation of citizens from host nations as well as citizens from other countries. What about NEO responsibilities?

The Department of State (DOS) has the lead in conducting NEOs. U.S.

Ambassadors or Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions are responsible for planning NEOs by preparing emergency action plans. Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for advising and assisting DOS with preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from hostile areas.³⁷ These efforts often turn hostile, like in "Operation Eastern Exit." There the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate U.S. citizens from the U.S. Embassy in Somalia on 1 Jan 1991.³⁸ Efforts like this often require a significant amount of U.S. military forces. Regardless of the type of operation the U.S. is involved in, it must first identify the threat.

IDENTIFICATION OF A THREAT/CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OBJECTIVES

A report of a threat may come from various sources, e.g., CINCs' subordinate units, TV news, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and others. If a CINC

does not make the initial report of an event, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) will make every effort to establish communications with the CINC and request a report to validate the reported event. Thus, under the current U.S. crisis response policy/system, the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military response is required. If not, then they determine what kind of response is required (i.e., diplomatic, economic, informational, political, psychological, etc.) to achieve the U.S. objective.³⁹ The objective is to make the enemy back down, to gain concessions from him, and thereby to further the U.S. interests in the international arena. But does the U.S. have the capability to achieve its military objectives?

The capability of the U.S. military to achieve its two near simultaneous MRC objectives will depend largely on several strategic mobility enhancements, such as increased funding for a larger force structure; increased airlift and sealift capability; additional pre-positioning of heavy equipment (afloat and ashore); improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Forces; improved logistics support; improved communications interoperability; and an improved acquisition program. The force composition will be the most significant factor in determining how well we can respond to crisis situations around the world and whether the U.S. crisis response policy is viable. However, our engagements must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most important to our interests and concentrating our resources to the areas of operation where we can make the most difference.⁴⁰

CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE COMPOSITION

The specific makeup of forces best configured to respond to diverse crises worldwide clearly demonstrates the complexity of challenges facing our nation and leaders, especially our military leaders both in CONUS and OCONUS. What is a typical force structure? A typical force structure for a crisis similar to Desert Storm would require Engineers, Water Purification Units, Communication Units, Army Airborne, Light Infantry, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Units, Attack and Lift Helicopters, Joint Special Operations, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Marine Amphibious Group Task Forces, Navy Carrier Groups, Seabees and Army Port and Logistic Units, not just for U.S. Forces but also to support U.N. Operations. It also would require an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Air Force and Navy Fighters, Army Air Defense Units, Air Force Air Lift, and Navy Sea Lift Forces. 41

Peacekeeping operations in the Sinai with Multinational Forces and Observers (MFOs) currently represent the most stable and predictable deployment of U.S. Forces. These forces operate primarily to deter conflict. Conflict prevention and deterrence are combined efforts to deter threats to the U.S. National Security Interests. Deterrence and preventive measures are other effective ways and means the U.S. can take to restore security and stability, and to guarantee adherence to international law and policy around the world. The U.S. used nuclear weapons for many years during the Cold War to deter Soviet threats abroad and against its homeland. Arms control was also an integral part of the U.S. national security against the Soviet threat.

One significant factor that enhanced our credible nuclear deterrence of a Soviet nuclear strike for so many years was the established means of communications between the American and Soviet heads of state. Although they were less than adequate and could have been substantially improved, they still met the objective for bilateral communications. Considering the volatility of the world today, much improved communication and intelligence systems will be needed to support crisis response forces.

CRISIS RESPONSE COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS

The rapid introduction of U.S. forces into a theater of operation requires good communications and intelligence systems that are reliable, accurate, continuous, and timely. Current communication and intelligence systems supporting crisis response forces have improved some since the Cold War ended. However, most of the U.S. communication and intelligence systems that support crisis response forces still need improvement. Interoperability and information integration continue to be our greatest concerns. Interoperability of systems and information integration must be achieved on the battlefield to maximize command and control (C2) for crisis response forces. Open systems architecture is a solution.⁴⁴

Program integration for command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems is without question the key initiative for improving crisis response communication and intelligence systems. Global end-to-end communications connectivity between U.S. and allied forces will be a crucial mission capability and force enhancer for worldwide readiness, mobility, and crisis responsiveness.⁴⁵

There is "light at the end of the tunnel." DOD is taking a unified approach, with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) taking the lead, to develop and evaluate communication and intelligence systems for the 21st century. These new systems should resolve the interoperability problem between joint and combined crisis response forces. They will also provide effective intelligence support that is crucial for achieving information warfare (IW) goals and objectives. IW will achieve information superiority by affecting the adversary's information, information-based processes, and information systems, while defending the U.S. information, information-based processes, and information systems. ⁴⁶ Improved C4I systems will contribute significantly to successful simultaneous crisis responses in the future. ⁴⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. current crisis response policy can not support a two almost nearly simultaneous MRC scenario. The U.S. airlift and sealift inadequacies make the two nearly simultaneous MRC scenario insupportable. In addition, our strategy to support two near simultaneous MRCs will be stressed by multiple Lesser Regional Conflicts (LRCs) abroad. The policy need to be changed to reflect the latest QDR and NDP strategies. The U.S. crisis response policy is only as good as the existing U.S. crisis action system -- it must be realistic and achievable.

The U.S. crisis action system is one of the best in world, if not the best. Like any other system, however, this system has its positive and negative attributes. On the positive side, we have the best-trained and most highly motivated service members in the

world, to include their leaders. The U.S. also has the best equipped and most technologically advanced Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps in the world. Although our airlift and sealifts are limited, they are still the most reliable lifts in the world. The U.S. military combat readiness, of itself, is a combat multiplier. Our U.S. military has proven time after time, when called upon any where in the world, that it can respond in a timely and most efficient manner. No other military in the world can make this claim.

There are two positive things that conspicuously support our capability to respond to a global crisis: our ability to plan for a crisis and our ability to carry it out. However, on the downside, we still have to improve our capability to acquire equipment faster, and we must also improve our communications interoperability, particularly with coalition forces. Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President confirms this assessment.

The U.S. crisis response policy cited in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy is not viable, insofar as it specifies a two-MRC capability, which assumes it has adequate lift capability. It can, however, become a supportable and viable policy, if additional funding becomes available to increase the military lift capability to support two almost near simultaneous crisis responses. If not, then the NSS and NMS policy need to be changed to incorporate national priorities and objectives that limit itself to a crisis response for only one MRC. The existing crisis-response policy and strategy should also advocate more U.S. allied participation. We need a more potent and ready coalition response capability.

The interagency planning process also should be improved. Without a more formal interagency planning process, planning and executing interagency missions will

continue to be haphazard and incomplete. Without a dedicated interagency planning cadre and some surge capacity developed in the civilian agencies, we will not have an effective and efficient planning and coordination core.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Change the crisis response policy cited in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy documents to reflect U.S. military crisis response support for only one MRC. The policy statement should state that the crisis-response conventional military force structure will respond to only one MRC. The U.S. crisis response policy should advocate the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs only if the QDR and NDP participants recommend to Congress that there be additional funding to increase, replace and technologically improve airlift and sealift capability to support two MRCs, and if Congress and the President approve.

Modify the crisis-response policy to emphasize increased participation of allied forces to counter hostile threats abroad--combined coalition forces crisis response. Also modify the crisis-response policy to support civilian agencies training for planning strategy for global contingencies and supporting military operations. The policy should mandate a series of political-military peace operation gaming exercises that would allow both civilian and military leaders to learn how the other would respond to complex crisis-response operations.

ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and
Enlargement, (Washington: The White House, February 1996), iii.
     <sup>2</sup>Ibid., 14
     <sup>3</sup>Ibid., 4.
     <sup>4</sup>Army War College, Exercise Guide: National Military Strategy Formulation Guide
(NMSFG) (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, sec I, App VII-2, 1996).
     5Ibid.
     <sup>6</sup>Ibid.
     <sup>7</sup>Ibid.
     8Ibid.
     9Ibid., VII-3.
     <sup>10</sup>Ibid., VII-4.
     <sup>11</sup>Ibid., VII-6.
     12 Ibid.
     <sup>13</sup> Ibid., VII-19.
     <sup>14</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (NMS) of The United States of
America (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995) 11.
     15 Ibid., ii.
     16 Ibid., 15.
     <sup>17</sup>NMSFG., VII-7.
     <sup>18</sup>John White, "Quadrennial Defense Review Before Defense Science Board," Deputy
SecDef News Release, ref no. 594-96 (October 18, 1996): 3.
     <sup>19</sup>John G. Morgan, Jr., "Preparing for Tomorrow's Troubles," Proceedings-U.S.
Naval Institute 122 (December 1996): 48.
     <sup>20</sup>Ibid., 50.
     <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
     <sup>22</sup>Reina Pennington, "Prophets, Herectics, and Peculiar Evils," A Commentary:
<a href="http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/penn.html">http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/penn.html</a>, 23 December 1996.
     <sup>23</sup>Jason Glashow,"Pending QDR Rails Military," <u>Defense News</u> (8-24 November
1996): 8.
     <sup>24</sup>Armed Forces Staff College, "Crisis Action Procedures," in The Joint Staff Officer's
Guide 1993, AFSC Pub 1 (Norfolk: U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), Sec. 7-7.
     25 Ibid.
     <sup>26</sup>NMS., 1.
     <sup>27</sup>Ibid.
     <sup>28</sup>Ibid.
     <sup>29</sup>Herbert L. Forest, Jr., "Crisis Response and the Interagency Process,"
<a href="http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/haiti/ch5.html">http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/haiti/ch5.html</a>, 7 December 1996.
     30 Ibid.
     <sup>31</sup>NSS., 14.
     <sup>32</sup>AFSC Pub 1., 7-2.
     <sup>33</sup>NSS., 12.
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<sup>34</sup>Ibid.
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³⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Military Operations Other Than War," in <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3.0 (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), V9-V10.

38 Ibid., V9.

³⁹AFSC Pub 1., 7-9.

⁴⁰ NSS., 11.

⁴¹John W. Foss, <u>Crisis Response Forces</u> (Arlington: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1994) Vol. 94-11, 2.

⁴²NSS., 11.

43 Ibid., 21.

⁴⁴Defense Intelligence Agency, <u>A Strategic Plan for The Defense Intelligence Agency</u>, Vector 21, (Washington: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency), 21.

⁴⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Command and Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 6-0, (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 May 1995), II-1 - II-11.

⁴⁶Department of the Army, <u>Army Vision 2010</u>, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army), 17.

47 Ibid.

³⁵Clinton, 18.

³⁶ Ibid.

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